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Perhaps she would argue that there is no double standard, i.e., that there is a morally relevant difference between human animals and nonhuman animals that justifies the difference in treatment. Are the lives of nonhuman animals less important, to them, than your life is to you? I can't imagine what it is.
There is a difficulty about drawing from all this a moral for ourselves. But then we can say this because we can say that all those are bad moralities, whereas we cannot look at our own moralities and declare them bad. It is natural to feel sympathy for animals who are suffering. This is bad faith.
Once I put two and two together and realized where my food came from and the moral inconsistency of it all there was no turning back. I must advocate on behalf of the animals in other ways. AnimalEthics helps me formalize my position so I can be a more effective advocate. Thanks again and keep up the good work.
This is a moral principle, and states that 'the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being'. This, however, is precisely what factoryfarming does.
Currently, I am very interested in social and political philosophy and ethical issues. I felt a strong sense of connection to the ideas of Peter Singer while taking Ethics from Keith. I find animals to be valuable for a number of reasons, one of which is for their aesthetic value.
To the Editor: “ A FactoryFarm Near You ” (editorial, July 31) does not mention any issue of the morality of factoryfarming—treating living beings as factory products. Cruelty to animals on such a scale should be the centerpiece of any discussion on raising animals for food.
The column, which you can read here , is a call to arms to factory farmers to fight back against those individuals and organizations working to protect farmanimals from the abuses inherent in factoryfarms. To learn more about Arizona's precedent-setting victory for farmanimals, see here.
An enormous volume of material has already appeared on the conditions under which animals live and die on factoryfarms, and more is almost certainly on the way. What the vegetarian wants, surely, is that we should stop eating meat even if our liking for it exceeds our revulsion at the suffering endured on factoryfarms.
Their interests are primarily protected, if at all, through archaic state anti-cruelty statutes that were not passed in contemplation of the factory-farm or genetic engineering. Though factory-farming and biotechnological techniques massively violate the moral rights of farmanimals, they have no remedy.
The initial attractiveness of utilitarianism as a moral theory on which to rest the call for the better treatment of animals was noted in an earlier context. Because animals are sentient (i.e., Because animals are sentient (i.e.,
It might be argued that any decrease in suffering for farmedanimals is good, morally speaking. Someone might argue that there is no incompatibility between (1) working to decrease animal suffering and (2) working toward the abolition of factoryfarming. What do you think of this ?
My view, then, is not that which it has often been taken to be in discussion and which Singer, Regan, Clark, and others blast in their work; I am not suggesting that, because they lack language, animals can be factoryfarmed without suffering. Animals are moral patients, but not moral agents.
There is no doubt a good deal of truth in this last point as well, and we are here presented with a serious moral problem concerning the world food supply. Michael Fox , "'Animal Liberation': A Critique," Ethics 88 [January 1978]: 106-18, at 116-7) But even this fails to establish a case for vegetarianism.
And thanks to federal corn and soybean subsidies, factoryfarms saved an estimated $3.9 It’s time that our tax dollars no longer finance the inhumane conditions—for workers and animals and the climate—of factoryfarms. I have visited many of the grotesque factoryfarms that now corrupt our rural landscapes.
Dogs were bred to be companion animals; pigs and cows are raised as food. To suggest that eating one and not the other represents a conflict of ethics is preposterous. However, I agree with Mr. Foer that factoryfarming has to go. Rather than eating dogs, we all ought to eat exclusively small-farmed, free-range meat.
Ethical vegetarianism is the thesis that killing and eating animals is morally wrong whenever equally nutritious plant-based alternatives are available. The case for ethical vegetarianism starts with several uncontroversial premises. It is not just a few outspoken animal rights fanatics who hold this view.
I’ll leave the question of infant care to the physicians, but I know firsthand that an adult vegan can enjoy robust physical health without contributing to the cruel suffering of animals on today’s factoryfarms. It’s appalling that anyone would think that a diet based on a dubious morality would build a human infant.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. In fact, animals used for food do suffer a great deal. This includes refusing to support business firms that cause, or profit from, animal suffering. The question arises: Why should such indirect causal influence have any moral import?
As such, they are likely to be better moral reasoners , as well, both in their ability to identify moral reasons and in their ability to appreciate these reasons. Given their knowledge of nutrition already hinted at in Gale's reasoning above, they realize that no one needs to eat animals or animal products in order to be healthy.
12): While this is a step in the right direction toward reducing the animal abuse inherent in all factoryfarming (from the chicken’s point of view), it’s still a long way from what nature intended. Let chickens be chickens, and avoid the whole moral dilemma by going vegan. Jean Bettanny Port Townsend, Wash.,
Jonathan Hubbell, a philosophy major at the University of Texas at Arlington, is the newest member of the AnimalEthics blog, and once again, I would like to welcome him aboard. In his fresh and candid first post (available here ), Jonathan admitted that he is struggling with the issue of ethical vegetarianism.
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