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I'd love to know whether philosophical reflection and argumentation has had an impact on your moral attitudes toward animals or on the moral attitudes towards animals of someone you know. Let us hear from you.
A third of a century ago, when the modern animal-liberation movement was in its infancy, Martin published an essay entitled “A Critique of Moral Vegetarianism,” Reason Papers (fall 1976): 13-43. You will, therefore, agree with Martin about moral vegetarianism but not about Christianity. Another reason is moral.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. CONCLUSION There is no doubt that moral vegetarianism will continue to be a position that attracts people concerned with the plight of animals and with humanitarian goals. One final point.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. SOME PROBLEMS OF MORAL VEGETARIANISM With respect to traditional moral vegetarianism some problems immediately come to the fore. Who exactly is not supposed to eat animals or products of animals?
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. People who do not eat meat for moral reasons tend to be less brutal than people who do eat meat. People who eat meat after reflection on the morality of eating meat are less brutal than people who eat meat without such reflection.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. ARGUMENTS FOR MORAL VEGETARIANISM A variety of arguments have been given for vegetarianism. Sometimes they take such a sketchy form that it is not completely clear they are moral arguments. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism.
There is a difficulty about drawing from all this a moral for ourselves. But then we can say this because we can say that all those are bad moralities, whereas we cannot look at our own moralities and declare them bad. It is natural to feel sympathy for animals who are suffering. This is bad faith.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. What Is an Animal Part? The last example suggests the difficulty of making a clear distinction between an animal part and an animal product. They suggest that any simple moral vegetarianism is impossible. KBJ: Bingo.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. One might assume—although again this assumption may not be jusitified [sic]—that Mr. One might assume—although again this assumption may not be jusitified [sic]—that Mr. Morse was using this consideration as a moral argument for vegetarianism.
He seems to think that the demand for free-range pork is a demand for wild pork, when in fact it's a demand for morally acceptable conditions for the pigs. Here is a New York Times op-ed column about free-range pigs. The author is confused. In other words, people want to eat not wild pigs but domestic pigs raised in humane conditions.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. The Argument from Animal Rights A stronger argument is made by people who maintain that animals have rights. In particular, it has been argued that animals have a right to life. According to Benn, only moral agents have rights.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. The Argument from Human Grain Shortage All of the clearly moral arguments for vegetarianism given so far have been in terms of animal rights and suffering. Tags: Moral Vegetarianism. KBJ: I’m speechless.
Let us think of the more moral members of society as a moral elite, much as the generality of scientists form a scientific elite. I hope I do not need to stress that such a moral elite must not be confused with a social or intellectual elite. I am myself not so heroic. I eat eggs though they may come from battery hens.
Again, all or most men in whom the moral consciousness is strongly developed find themselves from time to time in conflict with the commonly received morality of the society to which they belong: and thus—as was before said—have a crucial experience proving that duty does not mean to them what other men will disapprove of them for not doing.
Philosophers have shown that the standard reasons offered to exclude animals from the moral circle, and to justify not assessing our treatment of them by the same moral categories and machinery we use for assessing the treatment of humans, do not meet the test of moral relevance. 41 in A Companion to Bioethics , 2d ed.,
One restriction on the absolutism of man's rule over Nature is now generally accepted: moral philosophers and public opinion agree that it is morally impermissible to be cruel to animals. Controversies no doubt remain.
A nice moral bond of union, truly, between colonies and motherland! "We interknit ourselves with every part of the English-speaking world," said the journal of the Cosme colony , in Paraguay, describing its Christmas celebration of 1898, "by the most sacred ceremony of over-eating." Good living," unfortunately, is a somewhat equivocal term.
In the past I have been concerned to advocate a normative utilitarian theory from the point of view of a non-cognitivist meta-ethics. I assumed that Hume was right in thinking that ultimately morality depends on how we feel about things. I described the feelings to which I wished to appeal as "generalized benevolence."
Surely any sentient or conscious being has states that matter to it in a positive or negative way—pleasure matters to an animal in a positive way, pain or fear in a negative way. Given the logic of morality, we should extend our moral attention to those states that matter to it when our actions affect that being.
Since a number of "AnimalEthics" readers reside in the northern Illinois area, I thought I would call your attention to an exciting lecture that is taking place on Northern Illinois University's campus. She specializes in Environmental Ethics, Human-AnimalEthics, and Moral Psychology. Jenni, Ph.D.
It would remain true, of course, that the vegetarian diet is more limited, since every pleasure available to the vegetarian is also available to the carnivore (not counting the moral satisfactions involved, of course—which would be question-begging), plus more which are not available to the vegetarian so long as he remains one.
But when a moral being is feeling a pleasure or pain that is deserved or undeserved, or a pleasure or pain that implies a good or a bad disposition, the total fact is quite inadequately described if we say 'a sentient being is feeling pleasure, or pain'.
First of all, I want to tell you how much I enjoy AnimalEthics. I especially liked your posting from Gardner Williams’ “The Moral Insignificance of the Total of All Value.” I would love if you could mention AnimalWork.org on AnimalEthics to let your readers know about it. I read it all the time.
Dear Professor Burgess-Jackson, The Michigan Law Review ’s companion journal First Impressions this week published an online symposium on Agricultural Animals and Animal Law. The symposium includes contributions that discuss the moral status of nonhuman animals.
If you'd like to read Andrew Tardiff's 1996 essay "Simplifying the Case for Vegetarianism," write to me (by clicking "Contact" in the sidebar) and I'll send a copy. The essay is fabulous.
My basic moral position (as my emphasis on pleasure and pain and my quoting Bentham might have led Fox to suspect) is utilitarian. I make very little use of the word 'rights' in Animal Liberation , and I could easily have dispensed with it altogether. I have little to say about rights because rights are not important to my argument.
It was the first lecture series of its kind in german speaking world organized by the members of the Interdisziplinäre Arbeitsgemeinschaft Tierethik (literally “Interdisciplinary Study Group on AnimalEthics”) – an initiative of students. The results of the lectures are written down in this book.
Once I put two and two together and realized where my food came from and the moral inconsistency of it all there was no turning back. I must advocate on behalf of the animals in other ways. AnimalEthics helps me formalize my position so I can be a more effective advocate. Thanks again and keep up the good work.
Currently, I am very interested in social and political philosophy and ethical issues. I felt a strong sense of connection to the ideas of Peter Singer while taking Ethics from Keith. Currently, I do not believe that killing an animal is prima facie morally wrong.
Each of us can help bring an end to these terrible things by not eating animals, not wearing animals, not purchasing products tested on animals, and not consuming animal products.
Ethical vegetarianism is the thesis that killing and eating animals is morally wrong whenever equally nutritious plant-based alternatives are available. The case for ethical vegetarianism starts with several uncontroversial premises. It is not just a few outspoken animal rights fanatics who hold this view.
I do not share the extreme vegetarian view that food reform is the foundation of other reforms, for I think it can be shown that all cruelties to animals, whether inflicted in the interests of the dinner-table, the laboratory, the hunting-field, or any other institution, are the outcome of one and the same error—the blindness which can see no unity (..)
As regards animals, the position is clear. If an animal has the relevant moral capacities, actually or potentially, then it can be a possessor of rights. It may for this reason be morally appropriate for us meanwhile to act towards the former animals as if they are possessors of rights. (H.
Now when we ask what is the general nature of morally good actions, it seems quite clear that it is in virtue of the motives that they proceed from that actions are morally good. Thus a morally good action need not be the doing of a right act, and the doing of a right act need not be a morally good action.
Is there a morally relevant difference between hunting and dogfighting, such that only the latter is wrong? If there is no morally relevant difference between these activities, then either both are right or both are wrong. Hunting is morally acceptable. Hunting is morally acceptable. Dogfighting is morally unacceptable.
The question (presumably) is whether animals have moral status, i.e., whether the interests of animals must be taken into account in our deliberations. Using “who” assumes that the being in question has moral status (even if not full-blown personhood). Does your dog have the same moral status as your car?
That Kant should hold such a view should not be surprising; it is a direct consequence of his moral theory, the main outlines of which may be briefly, albeit crudely, summarized. As such, no moral agent is ever to be treated merely as a means. Moral agents are not nonrational, do not have "only a relative value," and are not things.
But since something can correctly be regarded as an object of moral action if, and only if, it is worthy of respect, it follows that persons, and persons only, can be objects of moral action. From this it follows that any being that is not a person can, with moral justification, be used merely as a means.
Under the moral law, all beings who have interests are subjects of rights, while all those who in addition to having interests, are capable of grasping the demands of duty, are subjects of duties. The defining characteristic of moral agency is autonomy ("rational self-determination"). Nonhuman animals (even apes) are in category 3.
If Smith thinks that plant rights and animal rights stand or fall together, then he is confused, for there is a morally relevant difference between plants and animals, namely, that only the latter are sentient. Addendum: Smith appears not to understand the animal-rights movement. Animals have weight on the moral scale.
It's morally permissible to eat cows. It's not morally permissible to eat dogs. There are no morally relevant differences between cows and dogs. He is asking them to state the morally relevant difference that justifies the rejection of 3. The following three propositions are inconsistent: 1.
Note that this debate is independent of the debate about the moral permissibility of eating fish. If organically raised fish suffer less than nonorganically raised fish, it is an accident, morally speaking. It's possible, in other words, that some organic methods inflict greater pain on the animals than nonorganic methods.
The predicament in such a non-moral case will concern only the individual and a few associates. When the ultimate values concerned are moral ones, on the other hand, and more particularly altruistic ones, the case is different; for the individual in such a dilemma has all society on his conscience. It need not.
The initial attractiveness of utilitarianism as a moral theory on which to rest the call for the better treatment of animals was noted in an earlier context. Because animals are sentient (i.e., Because animals are sentient (i.e.,
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