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There are intractable practical differences between environmental ethics and the animalliberation movement. Very different moral obligations follow in respect, most importantly, to domestic animals, the principal beneficiaries of the humane ethic. Every paragraph is interesting.
In the past I have been concerned to advocate a normative utilitarian theory from the point of view of a non-cognitivist meta-ethics. I assumed that Hume was right in thinking that ultimately morality depends on how we feel about things. Perhaps Smart was still thinking (in 1980) of Kant versus Bentham, rationality versus sentience.
A third of a century ago, when the modern animal-liberation movement was in its infancy, Martin published an essay entitled “A Critique of Moral Vegetarianism,” Reason Papers (fall 1976): 13-43. You will, therefore, agree with Martin about moral vegetarianism but not about Christianity. One is health.
It would only be surprising to one who assumes that my case for animalliberation is based upon rights and, in particular, upon the idea of extending rights to animals. My basic moral position (as my emphasis on pleasure and pain and my quoting Bentham might have led Fox to suspect) is utilitarian.
Some indication of the genuinely biocentric value orientation of ethical environmentalism is indicated in what otherwise might appear to be gratuitous misanthropy. The biospheric perspective does not exempt Homo sapiens from moral evaluation in relation to the well-being of the community of nature taken as a whole.
Some suspicion may arise at this point that the land ethic is ultimately grounded in human interests, not in those of nonhuman natural entities. The question of ultimate value is a very sticky one for environmental as well as for all ethics and cannot be fully addressed here.
There is no doubt a good deal of truth in this last point as well, and we are here presented with a serious moral problem concerning the world food supply. Michael Fox , "'AnimalLiberation': A Critique," Ethics 88 [January 1978]: 106-18, at 116-7) But even this fails to establish a case for vegetarianism.
The dark secret behind factory farm profits—cruel and inhumane animal husbandry—is getting out. Factory farmers treat animals inhumanely for no good reason. Since morally decent individuals oppose treating animals inhumanely for no good reason, factory farming is becoming an increasingly hard sell.
In setting out to write this paper, my intention was to fill a gap in my book AnimalLiberation. There I argued that the interests of animals ought to be considered equally with our own interests and that from this equality it follows that we ought to become vegetarian.
For the record, I am opposed to violence in behalf of animals. I can't think of anything that does more harm to the cause of animalliberation. In the long run, the best thing we can do for animals is engage in rational persuasion. I leave you this fine evening with a column by Debra Saunders.
Does my proposal as to what makes killing another human being generally a major moral wrong in any way help us with deciding what, if anything, is wrong with killing non-human animals and foetuses? Systematic cullings in the absence of feasible alternatives, therefore, may be morally permissible. I believe it does help.
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. Most moral vegetarians list fish and fowl as animals one should not eat. The ability to feel pain is not an obviously plausible way of morally distinguishing microorganisms from other organisms. What Meat Should Not Be Eaten?
For an explanation of this feature, click on “Moral Vegetarianism” at the bottom of this post. In fact, animals used for food do suffer a great deal. But is it true that by eating meat one is giving one’s tacit consent to the cruel treatment of animals? KBJ: I addressed this claim earlier.
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