Animal Rights Morals Press 
Animal Ethics
MARCH 5, 2007
I don't expect that many readers will be converted to the cause of animal rights by reading this book. Nor have I dealt with advances in the legal protection of animals both in practice and in theory. I have focused exclusively on moral theory. Nevertheless, I believe that a good theoretical argument is worth the effort.
Animal Ethics
SEPTEMBER 5, 2008
I believe that this view of the moral status of animals is radically mistaken, not because its distinguished proponents are somehow misinformed about the facts or insensitive in their attitudes, but rather because they misunderstand the basic terms of their own moral vocabulary even as applied to human beings.
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Animal Ethics
JUNE 11, 2008
But it seems to me, nevertheless, that in general, animals are among the sorts of beings of whom rights can meaningfully be predicated and denied. We must now ask ourselves for whose sake ought we to treat (some) animals with consideration and humaneness? Joel Feinberg , "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," chap.
Animal Ethics
JULY 24, 2012
The initial attractiveness of utilitarianism as a moral theory on which to rest the call for the better treatment of animals was noted in an earlier context. Because animals are sentient (i.e., Because animals are sentient (i.e.,
Animal Ethics
SEPTEMBER 6, 2012
There are also some things we cannot learn by using humans, if we respect their rights. The rights view merely requires moral consistency in this regard. ( Tom Regan , The Case for Animal Rights , updated with a new preface [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004], 388 [first edition published in 1983])
Animal Ethics
JUNE 27, 2012
That Kant should hold such a view should not be surprising; it is a direct consequence of his moral theory, the main outlines of which may be briefly, albeit crudely, summarized. As such, no moral agent is ever to be treated merely as a means. Moral agents are not nonrational, do not have "only a relative value," and are not things.
Animal Ethics
JANUARY 30, 2012
In 2002 the German Parliament amended Article 26 of the Basic Law to give nonhuman animals the right to be “respected as fellow creatures” and to be protected from “avoidable pain.” Half of the sixteen German states already have some sort of animal rights provisions in their constitutions. Salem and Andrew N.
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