Animal Ethics

NOVEMBER 17, 2008

Again, all or most men in whom the moral consciousness is strongly developed find themselves from time to time in conflict with the commonly received morality of the society to which they belong: and thus—as was before said—have a crucial experience proving that duty does not mean to them what other men will disapprove of them for not doing.

Morals 40

Morals Indianapolis Ethics Experiments 40

Animal Ethics

AUGUST 30, 2011

But when a moral being is feeling a pleasure or pain that is deserved or undeserved, or a pleasure or pain that implies a good or a bad disposition, the total fact is quite inadequately described if we say 'a sentient being is feeling pleasure, or pain'. Pleasure is good when, and only when, it is deserved.

Morals 40

Morals Indianapolis Humane Suffering 40

Animal Ethics

SEPTEMBER 19, 2011

Now when we ask what is the general nature of morally good actions, it seems quite clear that it is in virtue of the motives that they proceed from that actions are morally good. Thus a morally good action need not be the doing of a right act, and the doing of a right act need not be a morally good action.

Rights 40

Rights Indianapolis Morals Meat 40

Animal Ethics

JULY 30, 2007

We had better therefore take the less complicated case of animals, which we commonly suppose not to be even potential moral agents. If we take the first view, we are implying that in order to have rights, just as much as in order to have duties, it is necessary to be a moral agent. It is not at all clear which is the true view.

Animal Rights 40

Animal Rights Rights Animal Morals 40